@vathpela@better.boston
@vathpela@better.boston avatar

vathpela

@[email protected]

Hooloovoo, kernel{, }hacker. Building better worlds. Opinions are messages from space. Facts approximate. Photos are square. he/they. 0.9x engineer 🚴 :mbta: Ban cars.

This profile is from a federated server and may be incomplete. Browse more on the original instance.

mattblaze, to random
@mattblaze@federate.social avatar

Tracy, CA, 2010.

I believe the collective noun for wind turbines is "histogram".

All the pixels at https://www.flickr.com/photos/mattblaze/4491948497

vathpela,
@vathpela@better.boston avatar

@luis_in_brief @mattblaze I think that's largely because a vast majority of "we don't build anything anymore" arguers are against any policy that would result in building anything.

jerry, to random
@jerry@infosec.exchange avatar

This whole business of infosec.exchange not having exclusively infosec content has me so upset that I will be posting more cat and orchid pictures to make myself feel better

vathpela,
@vathpela@better.boston avatar

@jerry It's worse than that, it also proxies posts from other instances that also aren't exclusively infosec content! Like this drivel I'm posting now, for example.

malwaretech, to random
@malwaretech@infosec.exchange avatar

This is absolutely crazy stuff. Chinese hackers were able to get into a bunch of government email accounts by forging Microsoft access tokens, but how it happened is wild.

Apparently an internal Microsoft system responsible for signing consumer access tokens crashed, then a bug in the crash dump generator caused the secret key to be written to the crash dump. Microsoft's secondary system for detecting sensitive data in crash dumps also failed, allowing the crash dump to be moved from an isolated network to the corporate one. The Chinese hackers compromised a Microsoft engineer's account and were able to get a hold of the crash dump. They were not only able to find the key and figure out that it's responsible for signing consumer access tokens, but were also able to exploit a software bug to use it to sign enterprise access tokens too, basically giving them the keys to the kingdom.

So many security system had to fail for this to happen. Either the hackers were very lucky or extremely patient.

https://msrc.microsoft.com/blog/2023/09/results-of-major-technical-investigations-for-storm-0558-key-acquisition/

vathpela,
@vathpela@better.boston avatar

@malwaretech sigh. I've wanted to do this in Linux for years, but I've got a different job, and nobody really likes being given ideas. Basically it's just an mprotect() flag to mark stuff as not dumpable, not mappable from /proc (or map-on-read zero pages), and show the flag in /proc/pid/maps.

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